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Frontispiece. The Melms mansion (as seen in this undated nineteenth-
century photograph) faced south on Virginia Street in Milwaukee, slightly 
more than a block west of modern-day 6th Street. Courtesy of the 
Milwaukee County Historical Society.  
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MELMS V. PABST BREWING CO. AND  
THE DOCTRINE OF WASTE  
IN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 
THOMAS W. MERRILL* 
Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co.1 may be the most important decision 
ever rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste.2  
Unless your specialty is property law, that might not be enough to stir 
your interest.  The doctrine of waste, after all, does not loom very large 
in public consciousness these days. 
Nevertheless, waste has held a peculiar fascination for property 
theorists.3  The reason, I think, is that it touches directly on an important 
line of division in how we think about property.  Does property exist 
primarily to protect the subjective expectations that particular owners 
have in particular things? Or is the central function of property to 
maximize the value that society ascribes to particular things?  To put it 
somewhat dramatically, but I think not inaccurately: Is property an 
individual right or a social institution? 
Melms was decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1899.  It 
involved a mansion on the south side of Milwaukee that was demolished 
in the early 1890s by Captain Frederick Pabst, the brewer of Pabst 
Brewing Company fame.  Pabst owned the surrounding property, and 
thought he owned the mansion, too.  It turned out that Pabst did not 
 
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  This is an expanded 
version of Professor Merrill’s Robert F. Boden Lecture, delivered at Marquette University 
Law School in September 2010.  A comment by Richard A. Posner follows this article.  
Versions of the article and comment (abridged but with some additional images) were 
published in the Summer 2011 Marquette Lawyer.  The author wishes to thank Philip C. 
Babler, Andrew B. Davis, and Thomas G. Kamenick for exceptional research assistance. 
1. 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899). 
2. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.2 
(3d ed. 2000) (citing Melms as “[t]he leading American case” on ameliorative waste and 
referring to it extensively as a model for how waste disputes should be resolved by courts). 
3. For a sampling of views, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 54–58 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW § 3.11 (8th ed. 2011); JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, 
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 44–66 (2010); John A. Lovett, Doctrines of 
Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2007); John G. Sprankling, The 
Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1996). 
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own the mansion in fee simple.  Rather, according to another decision of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court—handed down four years after the 
mansion was destroyed4—he held it only for the life of an elderly widow 
named Marie Melms.  After Marie’s death, her children would have 
inherited the mansion, if it still stood.  The Melms children sued Pabst, 
claiming he had committed waste by destroying the home that was 
rightfully theirs. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1899 decision rejected the claim 
that Pabst had committed waste in leveling the mansion.5  The decision 
contained path-breaking language seeming to say that waste disputes 
should be resolved by comparing economic values.  In other words, the 
court appeared to adopt the view that property is a social institution, not 
an individual right.  My central objective here is to ask whether this is 
the correct understanding of the case, or of the lessons that it holds for 
property law more generally. 
I. 
Waste is one of the ancient writs of the common law, dating back to 
the twelfth century.6  It applies when two or more persons have interests 
in property, but at least one of them is not in possession.  A lease is the 
most familiar example; a life estate followed by a remainder would be 
another.  For convenience, I will generally refer to persons in possession 
as “tenants,” and those out of possession as “absent owners,” with the 
understanding that these terms cover a variety of situations with more 
technical terminology. 
Waste is an action by an absent owner to prevent the tenant from 
injuring the absent owner’s interest in property.  The action for waste 
has always been preventive in nature.  The Statute of Gloucester, 
enacted in 1278, provided that the absent owner could recover treble 
damages against the tenant for committing waste.7  This was obviously 
designed to deter tenants from harming the interests of absent owners.  
Many states today still have statutes providing for multiple damages for 
waste.8  The chancellor’s court of equity, again quite early on, issued 
 
4. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 148, 66 N.W. 244, 246 (1896). 
5. Melms, 104 Wis. at 15–16, 79 N.W. at 741. 
6. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.02 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2011).  For an 
overview of waste law, see STOEBUCK &  WHITMAN, supra note 2, §§ 4.1–4.5. 
7. 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278) (Eng.). 
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2919(2)(a) (West 2010) (“Any . . . life tenant 
. . . who commits or suffers any waste . . . is liable for double the amount of actual damages.”); 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 732 (West 1980) (“If a guardian, conservator, tenant for life or 
years, joint tenant, or tenant in common of real property, commit[s] waste thereon, any 
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injunctions against waste, also reflecting its preventive nature.9 
Waste comes in three varieties: permissive, voluntary, and 
ameliorative.10  Permissive waste is a form of nonfeasance.11  Suppose 
someone dies, leaving the tenant the house for life and then to the 
absent owner.  While the tenant is in possession, the roof develops a 
leak, but the tenant does nothing to correct the situation, causing the 
interior to suffer water damage.  Here, the tenant’s nonfeasance has 
harmed the absent owner’s interest in the house.  The absent owner has 
an action against the tenant for waste. 
Voluntary waste, the second variety, is a form of misfeasance.12  A 
simple example: the absent owner leases a farm with a cherry orchard to 
the tenant.  The tenant cuts down the cherry trees and sells them for 
wood.  Here the tenant’s misfeasance has damaged the interest of the 
absent owner.  The absent owner has an action for waste against the 
tenant. 
The third variety, called ameliorative waste,13 is the least common 
but by far the most interesting.  Suppose that the absent owner leases a 
warehouse to the tenant for twenty years.  Several years on, the tenant 
wants to remodel the warehouse into a trendy restaurant.  This clearly 
represents a fundamental change in the property.  But, the tenant 
argues, with supporting evidence from real-estate appraisers, the 
property would be worth much more, in market-value terms, as a 
restaurant than as a warehouse.  Should the absent owner be allowed to 
enjoin construction of the restaurant, or recover multiple damages 
against the tenant for waste, if the tenant remodels?  Or should we 
regard such market-value-enhancing changes as not being waste at all? 
Melms is a stark example of this third variety of waste.  Although the 
life tenant, Pabst, demolished the mansion, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that he was not guilty of waste.14  The court described how 
circumstances in the neighborhood had changed since the mansion was 
 
person aggrieved by the waste may bring an action against him therefor, in which action there 
may be judgment for treble damages.”). 
9. See 7 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278–79 (1926). 
10. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 
603–04 (2007). 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  Voluntary waste is also sometimes called “affirmative waste.” 
13. John Henry Merryman, Waste, in 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.11 n.1 
(A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“The various terms ‘meliorating,’ ‘ameliorating,’ ‘meliorative,’ 
and ‘ameliorative’ are all used to describe the same doctrine.  It is not contended that one is 
preferable to the others.  The matter seems to be largely one of taste.”). 
14. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 15–16, 79 N.W. 738, 741 (1899). 
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built.  The surrounding land had been graded down, leaving the mansion 
standing on an isolated knoll.15  What was once a residential 
neighborhood had become an industrial district.16  Because of these 
changes, the court said, the property was largely worthless as a 
residence.17  It was worth much more, in economic terms, with the 
mansion razed and the land graded down to the level of the surrounding 
property so that it could be used for industrial purposes.18 
Melms proved to be a milestone in a transformation in the law of 
waste that took place in the twentieth century.  Before Melms, all courts 
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste.  
Indeed, any material alteration of property by someone temporarily in 
possession was regarded as waste.19  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
acknowledged that this was the established rule.20 
After Melms, the old rule began to break down.21  Initially, other 
states followed Melms in considering changed circumstances.22  Later, 
 
15. Id. at 8, 79 N.W. at 738.  
16. Id.  
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
19. Courts more commonly referred to the idea that the tenant was prohibited from 
performing any act that would injure or prejudice “the inheritance.”  See Merryman, supra 
note 13, § 20.11 n.4 (“[A]ny alteration of the premises which is injurious to the inheritance is 
waste, even though it increases the value of the land.”).  Although this was less precise than 
“any material alteration,” for my purposes the different possible connotations can be ignored, 
since neither formulation embraced the modern, economics-focused conception of waste of 
which Melms is a precursor.  For other cases employing the “material alteration” standard, 
see, e.g., Parkman’s Adm’r v. Aicardi & Tool, 34 Ala. 393, 395–96 (1859) (“It is an old 
principle of the common law, that a tenant is guilty of waste, if he materially changes the 
nature and character of the building leased.”); Turman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,  317 P.2d 302, 
304 (Mont. 1957) (“[A]ny material alteration or change in the nature and character of a 
building on the leased premises, even though it enhances the value of the property and is 
beneficial to the reversion, constitutes waste.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hayman 
v. Rownd, 118 N.W. 328, 329 (Neb. 1908) (“Waste is an improper destruction or material 
alteration or deterioration of the freehold . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Winship 
v. Pitts, 3 Paige Ch. 259, 262 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (tenant has “no right to pull down valuable 
buildings, or to make improvements or alterations which will materially and permanently 
change the nature of the property, so as to render it impossible” to restore it at the end of the 
term).  
20. Melms, 104 Wis. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739 (citing Brock v. Dole, 66 Wis. 142, 28 N.W. 334 
(1886), and Bandlow v. Thieme, 53 Wis. 57, 9 N.W. 920 (1881), as previous cases that held 
that any material alteration of a property would constitute waste). 
21. See infra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.  
22. See, e.g., Chapman v. Cooney, 57 A. 928, 929 (R.I. 1904) (stating that the court 
should look to the “particular facts” of the case and apply the law “with reasonable regard to 
the circumstances”); Hamburger & Dreyling v. Settegast, 131 S.W. 639, 640–41 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1910) (endorsing the Melms view that changed circumstances are relevant, but finding 
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the traditional rule was replaced in many states by a multifactor 
standard.23  The standard is expressed differently, but typically it looks 
to factors such as what a normal owner would do with the property24 and 
whether the tenant’s actions had increased or decreased the economic 
value of the property.25  In practice, economic value tends to dominate 
everything else.  If the economic value goes up, this confirms what a 
normal owner would do and where the neighborhood is heading.  If the 
value goes down, the opposite inferences are drawn. 
The conventional rule of waste—that the tenant can make no 
material change in the thing without the permanent owner’s 
permission—is consistent with the view of property as an individual 
right.  The purpose of property law is to protect owned things from 
interference by others, whether by trespass or nuisance, fraud or theft.  
Property promotes autonomy, security, the ability to make long-term 
plans, the right to be different.  If I temporarily transfer possession of 
some thing to someone else, through a lease or a life estate, I am 
entitled to receive the same thing back.  This protects my subjective 
expectations about the thing—my plans for its use in the future—
without regard to whether these expectations or plans make sense from 
anyone else’s perspective. 
The newer view of waste, reflected in the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s decision in Melms, is consistent with the view of property as a 
social institution.  Temporary transfers of possession create a potential 
conflict of interest between the tenant and the absent owner.  Such 
conflicts should not be resolved by insisting that the views and 
aspirations of the absent owner always prevail.  We should instead ask 
whose views are more congruent with the interests of society.  The 
answer will depend on the circumstances of each case.  What we need is 
 
no changed circumstances presented). 
23. See Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11.  For more-recent examples, see Sprucewood 
Inv. Corp. v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 33 P.3d 1156, 1165 (Alaska 2001) (“Waste occurs when 
the owner of a possessory estate engages in unreasonable conduct that results in physical 
damage to the [property] and substantial diminution in the value of estates owned by others 
in the same [property].”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 146 A.2d 
458, 463 (N.J. 1958) (“The element of increased value can be but one of the many factors, 
having its greatest influence in long-term arrangements.”). 
24. See, e.g., Wingard v. Lee, 336 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (listing, among 
other factors to be considered, “whether the use is reasonable in the circumstances”). 
25. See, e.g., Zywiczynski v. Zywiczynski, 80 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) 
(stating that the tenant may not do “those things which are not necessary to the full 
enjoyment of the particular estate, and which have the effect permanently to diminish the 
value of the future estate”). 
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a flexible standard that allows courts to take into account a variety of 
factors, including, perhaps most importantly, economic value, in order 
to resolve these disputes in the way that is best for society. 
The same fundamental question—whether property is an individual 
right or social institution—arises throughout property law.  Consider the 
law of nuisance.  When property is threatened by pollution, are owners 
presumptively entitled to an injunction, allowing them to insist on 
shutting the polluting factory down?  Or must they be content with an 
award of damages, leaving it up to the factory to decide whether to stop 
polluting or to pollute and pay—whichever creates the greatest wealth 
for society?26  Similarly, consider the law of eminent domain.  Should the 
government be allowed to condemn property in return for payment of 
just compensation only in situations of strict necessity?  Or can the 
government use eminent domain for any project that promises to make 
the social pie larger, generating more jobs and tax revenue than the 
compensation that the government must pay to the owners whose 
property is taken?27 
Ameliorative waste, the issue in Melms, presents the same 
fundamental question, yet in a simple context, typically involving only 
two parties.  We can regard it as a bellwether for assessing our 
understanding of the basic purposes of property law. 
II. 
It is time to take a closer look at Melms.  The roots of the dispute lie 
in the untimely death of Charles T. Melms, generally known as “C. T.”  
In 1843 at the age of 24, Melms immigrated to the United States from 
Prussia and settled in Milwaukee.28  He married into a brewing family, 
becoming a partner with his father-in-law, Franz Neukirch.29  Around 
1854, Melms and Neukirch purchased land along Virginia Street, in the 
Menomonee Valley (so named after the local river) on the near south 
side of Milwaukee.  There they developed a state-of-the-art brewery 
complex, called the Menomonee Brewery.30  By 1860, it was one of the 
 
26. The classic case is Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).  See 
generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
27. This, of course, is the debate raised by Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). 
28. Naturalization record of Charles T. Melms in the Milwaukee County Historical 
Society.   
29. H. RUSSELL AUSTIN, THE MILWAUKEE STORY: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN 
CITY 81 (1946). 
30. H. Russell Zimmermann, South Side Building Recalls Those Early Brewing Days, 
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largest breweries in Milwaukee.31  In 1864, Melms constructed a 
handsome Italianate mansion on the site.32  The house was placed high 
atop a terraced and landscaped garden overlooking Virginia Street.  The 
terrace extended well to the west of the house, where Melms placed a 
beer garden with a fountain and gazebo (see Figure 1).33 
 
  
Figure 1. Melms mansion and beer garden, pre-1876, viewed from the 
southwest. Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-53917. 
 
MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 10, 1978, at 1.  For a slightly different account, see LOUIS F. FRANK, 
GERMAN-AMERICAN PIONEERS IN WISCONSIN AND MICHIGAN: THE FRANK-KERLER 
LETTERS, 1849–1864, at 326 n.6 (Harry H. Anderson ed., Margaret Wolff trans., 1971) 
(“Melms’s brewery had passed through several hands before he acquired it in 1848.  It was 
first established in 1841 by Simon Reutelshofer, who is generally regarded as the first to brew 
German-style lager beer in Milwaukee.”).  
31. THOMAS C. COCHRAN, THE PABST BREWING COMPANY: THE HISTORY OF AN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 54 (1948) (citing the Wisconsin Census of 1860).  Melms’s brewery is 
listed as the largest in terms of production in barrels.  This number may be in error, as it was 
almost twice the production of the next largest brewery and the other comparison statistics do 
not support this disparity.  Melms’s brewery had the second-largest number of employees 
(ten), the second-largest average monthly pay roll ($250), and the fifth-highest value of 
products ($30,000).  Id. 
32. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 7–8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899).   
33. Transcript of Record at 24 (testimony), Melms, 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738.  The cited 
document is a printed filing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court titled “Case”: it contains 
excerpts from the pleadings, testimony, exhibits, and findings in the lower court and is 
available, together with the briefs, in bound volumes titled Wisconsin Reports: Cases and 
Briefs, today found in the Eckstein Law Library at Marquette University.  As the name 
suggests, the organization of these volumes corresponds to the official decisions in the 
Wisconsin Reports.   
Figure 1 above shows the Melms mansion (on the right) and the beer garden and gazebo 
(on the left).  The frontispiece to this article also shows the mansion.  Figure 2 (on the next 
page) shows the site of the mansion on a late-nineteenth-century map of Milwaukee.   
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Figure 2. This section of an 1888 map places the Melms mansion in the larger 
context of Milwaukee. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society 
Library, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Libraries. 
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In 1869, Melms sat on a needle, and (in that era before antibiotics) 
developed an infection and then lockjaw.34  As he lingered before dying, 
Melms executed a will leaving all his real and personal property to his 
wife, Marie, and urging her to carry on the family business.35  Marie and 
two of C. T.’s brothers were named executors.36 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. C. T. Melms. Courtesy of the Milwaukee County Historical Society. 
 
C. T. Melms’s death at the age of 50 left his young widow, who spoke 
mostly German, with seven minor children to raise.37  Marie wanted to 
keep the business going but quickly concluded it was impossible.  The 
 
34. AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 82. 
35. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 187–88, 18 N.W. 255, 256 (1884). 
36. Id.  
37. Brief for Appellants at 1 and Supplemental Transcript of Record at 434 
(Memorandum of Opinion), Melms, 93 Wis. 153, 66 N.W. 518.  For a description and location 
of these materials, see supra note 33. 
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estate had debts far in excess of the value of its assets.38  On legal advice, 
Marie decided to exercise her right to renounce the will, and instead to 
take homestead and dower rights in the property.39  The homestead 
rights consisted of a life estate in the mansion and a quarter acre of land 
surrounding it.  The dower rights consisted of a one-third life estate in 
all other real property that her husband had owned, including the 
brewery complex.40  These marital property rights were subject to 
existing mortgages, but not to claims of unsecured creditors.41  Because 
Marie renounced the will, the balance of C. T.’s property passed by 
intestate succession to his children. 
After Marie renounced the will and took homestead and dower 
rights, the executors petitioned the probate court for permission to sell 
the remaining assets of the estate.  The court granted this request, in the 
form of a License for Executors’ Sale issued on January 5, 1870.42  The 
assets were sold in multiple transactions.  The property on which the 
mansion and the brewery stood, minus Marie’s homestead and dower 
rights and subject to existing mortgages, was sold to Jacob Frey, Marie’s 
brother-in-law, for $379.50.43  The purpose of this transaction, almost 
certainly, was to strip away the claims of as many unsecured creditors as 
possible.44  If the unsecured creditors failed to object before the 
transaction was completed, there would be nothing but $379.50 left in 
the estate to pay them. 
Once the sale to Frey closed, Frey and Marie entered into a joint 
contract to sell all their interests in the Virginia Street property to 
Frederick Pabst and Emil Schandein, who were then doing business as 
 
38. Brief for Appellants, supra note 37, at 1–2. 
39. Melms, 59 Wis. at 186, 18 N.W. at 255; Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra 
note 37, at 434 (Memorandum of Opinion). 
40. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20; Supplemental Transcript of Record, 
supra note 37, at 252–54, 361 (exhibits); see WIS. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (1871) (stating that a widow 
is “entitled to a dower, or use during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands” of her 
husband). 
41. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 147–48, 66 N.W. 244, 246 (1896) (“[I]f 
[Marie Melms] took under the law, she took a life estate in the homestead, subject to 
mortgages . . . and she could take free of claims for unsecured debts her dower estate in the 
remaining real estate.”).  This conclusion presumably refers at least in part to WIS. STAT. ch. 
94, § 1 (1871) (“When the personal estate . . . shall be insufficient to pay all [the deceased’s] 
debts . . . , his executor or administrators may mortgage, lease, or sell his real estate (except 
the homestead) for that purpose . . . .”).   
42. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 79–80 (license); see also Supplemental 
Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 414 (Memorandum of Opinion). 
43. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20. 
44. COCHRAN, supra note 31, at 60. 
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the Phillip Best Brewing Company.45  Marie sold her homestead and 
dower rights, and Frey sold everything that he had purchased from the 
estate.  The sale to Pabst was for $95,000, minus assumption of 
mortgages, netting $40,000 for Marie, which was paid to her over time 
pursuant to a purchase-money mortgage.46  Marie moved into humbler 
quarters, and used the money from the sale of the homestead and dower 
rights to support and educate her large brood of children.47  Schandein 
and his family moved into the Melms mansion.48 
 
 
Figure 4. Frederick Pabst. Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-60078. 
 
45. Melms, 93 Wis. at 153–55, 66 N.W. at 518–20. 
46. Id. at 159–60, 66 N.W. at 519.  
47. Marie lived in Milwaukee until 1879, when she moved to Massachusetts for a year 
and lived with her son, Gustav Melms.  She thereupon lived a year in Chicago, five years 
abroad, another decade and a half or so in Milwaukee again, and, finally, her last year in 
Germany, the region from which she had emigrated to the United States ca. 1840.  See 
Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 76 (testimony); infra note 72 (and 
source cited). 
48. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 21–22 (testimony).  
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The next almost twenty years, Pabst and Schandein operated the 
Melms brewery as the South Side Brewery of the Phillip Best Brewing 
Company, later to be known as the Pabst Brewing Company.49  The 
company made many improvements during this time, including building 
a bottling house (which still stands), an elevator, coal sheds, icehouses, 
and railroad sidings.50 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Phillip Best Brewing Co.’s “South Side Brewery” along the 
Menomonee Canal, ca. 1880 (old Melms brewery in the background). 
Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society. WHi-54326. 
 
After the Melms children grew to be adults, some of them became 
convinced that they had been cheated out of their inheritance.51  It 
seems they were unaware, at least initially, that their father’s estate had 
been insolvent, or that their mother and their uncles had contrived to 
defraud many of the creditors of the estate.  No doubt the transactions 
 
49. COCHRAN, supra note 31, at 61. 
50. Melms, 93 Wis. at 162, 66 N.W. at 520. 
51. See id. (noting that the children sued claiming that the transactions deprived them of 
their inheritance and were fraudulent). 
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of 1870 and 1871, which had the effect of removing the Melms family 
from the mansion their father had built and putting them in much-
reduced circumstances, had not been characterized this way around the 
family dinner table. 
In 1882, the children retained a lawyer and sued to set aside one of 
the sales of property by the estate, some six-and-one-half acres to the 
west of the brewery, described as lying in the “Menomonee Marsh,” 
which had been purchased by Guido Pfister.52  The lawsuit advanced a 
number of technical grounds for invalidating the sale: for example, that 
the probate court had required notice of the sale in the “Milwaukee 
Sentinel,” but the notice had instead been published in the “Milwaukee 
Daily Sentinel.”53  The most important claim was that an independent 
guardian should have been appointed to protect the rights of the Melms 
children.54  This and all the other claims were rejected with little 
difficulty by both the circuit court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court.55 
In 1886, Pabst and Schandein decided to consolidate their operations 
in an enlarged north side brewery, called the Empire Brewery.  They 
closed the South Side Brewery and all its associated operations on 
Virginia Street.  Schandein moved out of the mansion and died in 1888.56  
The bottling house, which was relatively new, was converted into a 
machine shop for the Norberg Manufacturing Company.57  In 1891–1892, 
Pabst razed the mansion and graded the terraces on which it had stood, 
down to the level of the surrounding property.58  His apparent objective 
was to prepare the property for sale or lease as an industrial site, the 
judgment being that it would obtain a higher price if uniformly graded 
and without the mansion.59  The site was eventually sold to the Pfister & 
Vogel Leather Company. 
About the same time Pabst was tearing down the mansion, the 
Melms children learned from an uncle that the sale of property by the 
estate to Frey in 1870 was vulnerable because their mother—one of the 
executors—was a secret beneficiary of this transaction.  After further 
 
52. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 18 N.W. 255 (1884). 
53. Id. at 189, 18 N.W. at 257. 
54. Id. at 190–91, 18 N.W. at 257. 
55. Id. at 186–97, 18 N.W. at 255–60. 
56. Brief for Appellants at 10, Melms, 104 Wis. 7, 78 N.W. 738; see supra note 33 
(explaining where this document may be found). 
57. See Rascher’s Fire Insurance Atlas of the City of Milwaukee 145–46 (1888).  
58. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899); see also Brief for 
Appellants, supra note 56, at 10–11. 
59. Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 54–55 (testimony). 
MELMS 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  11:02 PM 
1068 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1055 
legal consultations, they decided to try their luck at litigation again.  
This time they sued their mother, as well as Pabst, claiming that the 
transaction from the estate to Frey was void, and hence Pabst had no 
valid title to the property.60  They also claimed that the only interest 
Pabst had acquired in the homestead was their mother’s life estate, and 
that the remainder after her death (she was still alive at the time) 
belonged to them.61 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed these claims in separate 
opinions in 1896.  The claim that the sale to Frey was void for fraud was 
assigned to Justice Silas Pinney.62  He concluded that the sale was merely 
voidable, not void, and that Pabst was a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of any fraud, and hence had good title.63  Moreover, the 
children had waited too long to sue, and the action was barred by 
laches.64 
Justice John Winslow was assigned to deal with the homestead.65  
The critical issue was whether the children’s remainders were included 
in the rights sold by the estate to Frey in 1870.  If the remainders were 
sold to Frey, then Frey had sold them to Pabst.  If the remainders were 
not sold by the estate, they still belonged to the children. 
The key document was the deed from the executors to Frey, 
executed on May 25, 1870, which was ambiguous on this point.  It sold 
the entire parcel of land on Virginia Street, together with “brewery, 
buildings & improvements thereon,” “excepting . . . that portion, which 
has been set apart as a homestead to the widow of the said deceased.”66  
It then proceeded to set forth a metes-and-bounds description of the 
quarter acre of land set apart as the homestead, concluding with the 
qualification that the described quarter acre was “subject to four 
 
60. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 155−56, 66 N.W. 518, 518 (1896). 
61. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 140, 143, 66 N.W. 244, 245 (1896). 
62. Melms, 93 Wis. 153, 66 N.W. 518.  
63. Id. at 165−70, 66 N.W. at 521−23. 
64. Id. at 170−75, 66 N.W. at 523−25. 
65. Melms, 93 Wis. 140, 66 N.W. 244. 
66. Deed from Executors of Charles T. Melms to Jacob Frey, May 25, 1870, recorded in 
Milwaukee County Courthouse, May 31, 1870, vol. 115, p. 600.  The License for Executors’ 
Sale, dated January 5, 1870, authorizing the estate to sell all of the Virginia Street property, 
used similar language.  It excepted from the authorization of sale “that portion which has 
been set apart as a homestead to the widow of the said deceased.”  Transcript of Record, 
supra note 33, at 80; accord id. at 80–81 (order dated May 25, 1870, confirming executors’ 
sale). 
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mortgages on the whole property, including said homestead and to the 
right of dower, as herein above mentioned.”67 
This can be interpreted in two different ways.  By excepting “that 
portion” set aside for the homestead, did the deed except from the sale 
only Marie’s legal homestead rights, i.e., her life estate?  Or did it except 
from sale both her life estate and the children’s remainders?  If only the 
life estate was excepted, then the remainders were included in the 
property sold to Frey.  If both the life estate and the remainders were 
excepted, then the remainders were not sold to Frey and instead 
descended to the children.  The last quoted sentence is also unclear in its 
import.  It seems to say that the quarter acre set aside as the homestead 
is subject to four mortgages and to Marie’s dower rights.  Significantly, it 
does not say the described land is subject to Marie’s homestead rights—
this would have clearly signaled that a fee simple in the quarter acre was 
excepted from sale.  Rather, it says that the quarter acre is subject to 
four mortgages that apply to the whole property “including” the 
homestead (and is subject to the dower right).  This carried forward the 
ambiguity about whether “the homestead” referred only to Marie’s life 
interest, or to her life interest plus the remainders.68 
For reasons that are unclear, Pabst’s lawyers never focused on the 
language of the deed from the estate to Frey, either in the trial court or 
on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Perhaps the trial court’s 
finding that the sale to Frey was a “mere sham,” and that Frey took the 
property upon “a secret trust” to hold it for Marie,69 discouraged the 
lawyers from using the deed to establish a chain of title running from the 
children to Pabst.  But the fact that Marie and Frey conspired to defraud 
third parties should have had no bearing on the validity of the chain of 
transactions as among the estate, Frey, and Pabst and Schandein—none 
of whom was found to have committed fraud on the other.  In any event, 
Pabst’s lawyers made no attempt to establish a chain of title, relying 
instead on other arguments in favor of holding that Pabst had acquired 
 
67. Deed from Executors of Charles T. Melms, supra note 66.  
68. It is of course rather odd that if only a life estate were excepted, the deed would also 
make special note of the fact that the dower rights were excepted.  The dower rights were also 
a life estate, see WIS. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (1871) (stating that a widow is “entitled to a dower, or 
use during her natural life, of one-third part of all the lands” of her husband), so the deed 
would be excepting a life estate in a life estate.  But the dower rights were a life estate in a 
thirty-three percent interest in all the land of which the husband died seized, whereas the 
homestead was a full life estate in only the family home and one-quarter acre of land.  I would 
attribute any overlap to lawyerly caution in wanting to cover all the bases. 
69. See Melms, 93 Wis. at 142, 66 N.W. at 246; Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra 
note 37, at 416 (Memorandum of Opinion). 
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the remainders, which Justice Winslow had no difficulty resolving in 
favor of the children.70  The result was that Pabst was found to have 
acquired only a life estate pur autre vie in the homestead property, 
which would expire upon the death of Marie.71  (She would die in late 
1899.72) 
The conclusion that Pabst had acquired only a life estate was, in my 
view, almost certainly wrong.  The License for Executors’ Sale and the 
deed to Frey were admittedly ambiguous.  But the ambiguity should 
have been resolved in favor of Pabst, for three reasons.  First, the deed 
that Marie and Frey executed when they sold their interests to Pabst a 
year later was a warranty deed, promising that Marie and Frey jointly 
had sufficient interests to confer fee-simple title on Pabst.73  Such a deed 
necessarily meant that Marie and Frey were selling both Marie’s interest 
in the homestead and the remainder interests in the homestead.74  
Second, Wisconsin law at the time provided that ambiguous grants of 
land should be construed as conveying “all the estate.”75  All the estate 
here would mean both the life estate and the remainders.  Finally, 
ambiguous deeds are construed against the drafter.76  Since Marie, as an 
executor of her husband’s estate, had signed the deed to Frey, any 
ambiguity in that deed should have been construed in favor of the 
 
70. Pabst argued that when Marie renounced the will and elected to take marital 
property rights under the law, she nevertheless still inherited the remainders under the will.  
The court responded that the statutes called for an election: either one takes under the will or 
one renounces the will—it is all or nothing.  See 93 Wis. at 145–48, 66 N.W. at 249.  Pabst 
argued in the alternative that, by assuming the mortgages on the homestead property, he 
acquired an equitable title to the remainders.  The court rejected this, too, noting that 
assumption of the mortgages was part of the original consideration for the conveyance from 
Marie to Pabst and Schandein, and was not a voluntary undertaking by Pabst to preserve the 
title of the remaindermen.  Id. at 148–50, 66 N.W. at 245–47.    
71. Id. at 145, 66 N.W. at 246.  
72. See Mail Bag Used as Hearse, LIMA NEWS (Lima, Ohio), Dec. 14, 1899 (stating that 
“[s]o far as known, for the first time the United States mails have been used as a hearse” and 
recounting how the ashes of Marie Melms, widow of C. T. Melms, were returned by mail from 
Germany for burial in Milwaukee).  
73. Supplemental Transcript of Record, supra note 37, at 341–44 (Exhibit 65: Deed from 
Frey and wife and Marie Melms to Pabst and Schandein).  
74. A warranty deed is one in which “the grantor assures the grantee that there are no 
defects in the title whatsoever . . . .” 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, 
§ 81A.03[1][b][ii].  Wisconsin decisions from the period of Melms frequently employ the term 
in this sense.  See, e.g., Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618, 620 (1874); Hooe v. Chi., Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 98 Wis. 302, 302−03, 73 N.W. 787, 787 (1898).  
75. WIS. STAT. ch. 103, § 2278 (1878) (providing “[e]very devise of land . . . shall be 
construed to convey all the estate”). 
76. 14 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 81A.05[3][b][i]; see, e.g., Lintner v. 
Office Supply Co., 196 Wis. 36, 42−43, 219 N.W. 420, 422 (1928). 
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grantee, Frey, meaning that he received the remainders.  For multiple 
reasons, then, the instruments should have been construed to mean that 
the estate sold the children’s remainders to Frey, who in turn sold them 
to Pabst. 
Did the estate have the authority to sell the children’s remainders?  
Almost certainly it did.  These were vested remainders, not contingent 
remainders, and vested remainders have always been regarded as being 
alienable inter vivos.77  When Marie rejected the will, electing to take a 
life estate in the homestead, the remainders in the homestead were 
inherited by the children, who were minors.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in the Pfister case decided in 1884, had specifically held that 
Marie, as an executor of the estate and legal guardian of the children, 
was competent to act on their behalf.78  Thus, the estate had the 
authority to sell the children’s remainders in the homestead, just as it 
had authority to sell all the other interests that the children had 
inherited by intestate succession from their father.79 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s erroneous ruling that Pabst had 
only a life estate in the homestead nevertheless gave the Melms children 
their third and final shot at securing some satisfaction from the Pabst 
Company.  If Pabst had only a life estate, then Pabst had a legal duty not 
to commit waste to the injury of the remaindermen, i.e., the Melms 
children.  Accordingly, the children sued Pabst yet again, this time for 
committing voluntary waste by demolishing the mansion on the 
homestead property in 1891–1892.80  Under Wisconsin law at the time, a 
party who committed waste was liable for double damages.81  The 
children sought to show that the mansion had a substantial value, and 
that they were entitled to recover not only possession of the one-quarter 
acre of homestead land once their mother died, but also two times the 
cost of restoring the mansion as it had been before its destruction.82 
  
 
77. 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 23.06 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
78. Melms v. Pfister, 59 Wis. 186, 189–91, 18 N.W. 255, 259 (1884) (discussed in text 
accompanying notes 52–55 supra). 
79. A potential complication here is that the eldest Melms son may have reached the age 
of majority (twenty-one) by the time the estate sold the property to Frey.  But it does not 
appear that this was ever asserted by the children as a ground for overturning the sale to Frey.  
80. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899). 
81. Id. at 7, 79 N.W. at 738 (citing WIS. STAT. § 3176 (1898)). 
82. See Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 17–26 (testimony).  
 
MELMS 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  11:02 PM 
1072 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1055 
It is not unlikely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, when it heard 
the third Melms lawsuit in 1899, realized that it had made an error in 
holding that the Melms children had remainders in the homestead 
property.  At the very least, it must have realized that it would be highly 
inequitable to penalize Pabst for acting as though he owned the mansion 
outright when he had every reason to believe, based on the 
representations of the parties from whom he had purchased the 
property, that he owned the mansion outright.  The right thing to have 
done—the candid, forthright, courageous thing to have done—would 
have been to overturn the decision about title to the homestead, or at 
least to absolve Pabst from liability based on a good-faith error.  But, 
perhaps to avoid an embarrassing reversal, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court did not do the right thing.  Instead, it fudged the facts, and, in so 
doing, transformed the law of waste. 
III. 
When the Melms children’s waste action went to trial, the opposing 
sides presented very different views of the waste issue.  The children’s 
theory was that they were entitled to inherit a specific thing—the 
mansion built by their father.  In order to make them whole, Pabst was 
required to pay an amount that would permit the mansion to be 
reconstructed.  The children therefore submitted testimony designed to 
show the cost of rebuilding the mansion.  They offered witnesses who 
testified to the high quality of the materials: marble floors, carved 
banisters, a large dance room—even indoor plumbing and steam heat.83  
An architect testified it would cost at least $25,000 to rebuild;84 C. T. 
Melms’s youngest brother, who was in the fire insurance business, 
testified that that it would cost $25,000;85 a building contractor testified 
that it would cost “about $20,000.”86 
Pabst presented a very different view of the matter.  In his view, the 
critical question was the market value of the mansion.  The children, he 
conceded, were entitled to the land on their mother’s death, but they 
should not be awarded damages for waste if the presence of the mansion 
added nothing to the value of the land.  Pabst’s witnesses therefore 
testified that the mansion, if it still stood, would have little or no rental 
 
83. Id. at 17–18 (testimony of Gustav Melms). 
84. Id. at 19 (testimony of Charles A. Gombert). 
85. Id. at 22 (testimony of Leopold Melms). 
86. Id. at 24–25 (testimony of George B. Posson). 
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value and would not be attractive to purchasers at any price.  Some 
witnesses said that the elevation of the structure high above the street 
meant that there were too many steps to climb.87  Others testified that 
the dominant use of property on the north side of Virginia Street had 
changed from residential to manufacturing, and that the highest and 
best use of the land would be as a factory site.88  The picture they 
painted was of a forlorn house perched on a high knoll, surrounded by 
industrial property.  The circuit court ruled that Pabst had not 
committed waste.89 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.  Justice 
Winslow, perhaps as penance for his decision in the homestead case, was 
again given the honors of writing the opinion.  He made a valiant effort 
to appear to preserve continuity with the past.  There was nothing 
wrong with traditional definitions of waste, he wrote, including 
Wisconsin precedent holding that “any material change in the nature 
and character of the buildings made by the tenant is waste, although the 
value of the property should be enhanced by the alteration.”90  The basic 
concepts should remain “much the same.”91  Nevertheless, it was 
important to recognize that application of these concepts was 
necessarily subject to “reasonable modifications as may be demanded by 
the growth of civilization and varying conditions.”92 
Thus, although the Wisconsin court had previously held that it was 
waste for a tenant to cut a hole in the roof of a boarding house to install 
a chimney, the present case involved “radically different”93 elements.  
What was so radically different about Pabst’s destruction of the Melms 
mansion?  Simply put, the neighborhood had changed.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court painted a picture of inexorable socioeconomic change 
sweeping the south side of Milwaukee: 
 
  
 
87. Id. at 27–28 (testimony of D.G. Rogers); see also id. at 39 (testimony of A.L. 
Worden); id. at 40–41 (testimony of R.C. Reinertsen). 
88. Id. at 32 (testimony of Fred Vogel, Jr.); id. at 34 (testimony of C.W. Milbrath); id. at 
37 (testimony of Emil Durr); id. at 44 (testimony of George Bensenberg).  
89. Id. at 12–14 (findings and judgment); Melms, 104 Wis. at 9, 79 N.W. at 738.   
90. Melms, 104 Wis. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739 (quoting Brock v. Dole, 66 Wis. 142, 28 N.W. 
334 (Wis. 1886)). 
91. Id. at 11, 79 N.W. at 739. 
92. Id.   
93. Id. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740. 
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The evidence shows that the property became valueless 
for the purpose of residence property as the result of the 
growth and development of a great city.  Business and 
manufacturing interests advanced and surrounded the 
once elegant mansion, until it stood isolated and alone, 
standing upon just enough ground to support it, and 
surrounded by factories and railway tracks, absolutely 
undesirable as a residence and incapable of any use as 
business property.  Here was a complete change of 
conditions, not produced by the tenant, but resulting 
from causes which none could control.94 
 
Under the circumstances, the court indicated, no reasonable person in 
Pabst’s position could ignore the new conditions in the neighborhood. 
The court reinforced its emphasis on changed circumstances by 
noting a variety of agricultural analogies.  If an orchard was rendered 
permanently unproductive by disease or death of the trees, would the 
tenant be prohibited from turning the land into a vegetable garden?95  If 
the market for grain collapsed, would a wheat farmer be prohibited 
from planting the fields with tobacco?96  The most dramatic analogy was 
to a North Carolina case, which had considered whether it was waste for 
a life tenant, after the Civil War, to allow quarters for former slaves to 
fall into disrepair.97  The Wisconsin Supreme Court thought it was 
entirely proper to hold in those circumstances that the duty of the tenant 
was not to preserve the slave quarters intact, but to act as “a prudent 
owner of the fee” would have acted in the face of the dramatic change 
brought on by emancipation—in other words, to let the slave quarters 
deteriorate.98 
  
 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 14, 79 N.W. at 740. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 14–15, 79 N.W. at 740–41 (citing Sherrill v. Connor, 12 S.E. 588 (N.C. 1890)). 
98. Id. at 15, 79 N.W. at 741. 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court said that its decision was not to be 
construed as justifying a tenant in making substantial changes in order 
“to suit his own whim or convenience” or because the changes would be 
“in some degree beneficial.”99  But the Melms mansion had “no practical 
value, and would not rent for enough to pay the taxes and insurance 
thereon”; if converted to “business property, it would again be useful, 
and its value would be largely enhanced.”100  The court concluded that 
when “there has occurred a complete and permanent change of 
surrounding conditions, which has deprived the property of its value and 
usefulness as previously used,” the question whether the tenant “has 
been guilty of waste in making changes necessary to make the property 
useful” was a question of fact, to be decided by the trier of fact.101 
It would be an overstatement to say that Melms unequivocally 
repudiated the understanding of property as the right to specific things, 
and substituted in its place an understanding of property as a storehouse 
of wealth measured by market prices.  After all, the court insisted that, 
ordinarily, a tenant is obliged to return the thing in a substantially 
unchanged condition when the tenancy ends.102  But by creating an 
exception for changed circumstances, the court moved a long way 
toward embracing the understanding of property as economic value.  
The court asked rhetorically at one point, “Must the tenant stand by and 
preserve the useless dwelling-house, so that he may at some future time 
turn it over to the reversioner, equally useless?”103  The statement 
implies, at least when market values change significantly, that the duty 
to preserve the identity of the thing is trumped by considerations of 
economic value. 
IV. 
The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Melms rests on one 
of the oldest tricks in the appellate court playbook: changing the facts to 
fit the desired result.  The Melms mansion was affected by changed 
circumstances before it was demolished, but the changes were not the 
product of urban growth or socioeconomic changes to the 
 
99. Id.  
100. Id.  at 8–9, 79 N.W. at 738.  
101. Id. at 15–16, 79 N.W. at 741. 
102. Id. at 10, 79 N.W. at 739. 
103. Id. at 13, 79 N.W. at 740. 
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neighborhood.  The changes were due to the actions taken by Pabst 
himself.104 
When Pabst and Schandein purchased the property, the mansion and 
the beer garden were an integral part of a valuable and fully functioning 
brewery operation.  The mansion would be occupied by the brewmaster 
and his family, who would oversee the operations of the brewery, the 
malt house, the bottling plant, and the other associated facilities.  The 
beer garden on the terrace, in common with other breweries operated 
by German families in Milwaukee in the nineteenth century, served as 
an important marketing tool in selling beer.  The house and beer garden 
stood on an elevation facing a dense residential neighborhood and 
beckoned to thirsty customers on warm evenings.  Photographs from the 
era show that other brewery operations had beer gardens on elevated 
terraces and brewmaster houses that were somewhat similarly located in 
relation to the brewing operations.105 
The first action taken by Pabst that undermined the economic value 
of the mansion was the decision to open a new bottling plant in 1881, 
just to the west of the mansion.106  This required cutting down a large 
portion of the terrace that served as a beer garden.  Several years later, 
Pabst closed the South Side Brewery and consolidated his operations in 
the Empire Brewery on the north side.  Considering only access to 
transportation, this was a questionable decision.  The South Side 
Brewery had an enviable location, abutting both water and a rail line.  
These facilities provided the South Side Brewery with ready access to 
the two principal modes of commercial transport at the time.  The 
Empire Brewery, which was landlocked, had neither advantage, and 
thus incurred the additional expense of having its barrels hauled to a 
train station or docking facility.  It is possible that changing 
demographics had something to do with the decision.  The south side 
 
104. The witnesses for Pabst in the circuit court were well aware of these facts, and 
carefully avoided any claim that the circumstances facing the Melms mansion in the early 
1890s were attributable to anything other than Pabst’s own actions.  See Transcript of Record, 
supra note 33, at 26–61 (testimony). 
105. See, e.g., The Milwaukee of a Half Century Ago: A City of Foaming Beer and Good 
Music, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 16, 1932, at 1, available at http://www.wisconsinhistory. 
org/wlhba/articleView.asp?pg=8&id=11277&key=Immigrant&cy= (last visited April 13, 2011) 
(containing an illustration of Schlitz Park which displays a structure elevated on a hill).  The 
elevation may have been to provide for underground storage and natural refrigeration for the 
brewing operation. 
106.  Zimmermann, supra note 30, at 1.  The building, which still stands, bears the date 
“1881” on the cornice.   
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was rapidly being populated with Polish immigrants,107 and Pabst may 
have regarded the north side, which was more heavily German, as a 
more congenial location.  The critical point is that the decision by Pabst 
to close the South Side Brewery was not forced on him by economic 
necessity but was a voluntary decision of uncertain motivation. 
Closing the South Side Brewery set in motion a series of actions that 
led to the destruction of the mansion.  Once the brewing operations 
were eliminated, it no longer made sense to keep a beer garden and 
brewmaster’s house on the property.  Sure enough, without a brewery to 
supervise, Schandein moved away, leaving the house vacant.  The 
remaining terrace on which the beer garden stood was soon cut away, 
leaving “an isolated lot and building, standing from twenty to thirty feet 
above the level of the street.”108  Critically, it was this point in time—
when the house stood empty on an isolated knoll—that the Pabst 
witnesses used as their point of reference in commenting on the market 
value of the mansion.109  But the fact that the mansion had much-
diminished market value because of its physical isolation and lack of a 
tenant was entirely due to decisions made by Captain Pabst. 
What then about the neighborhood?  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
suggested that the neighborhood had been transformed from residential 
to industrial, and hence was no longer a fit place for a family to live.110  
But a careful review of the testimony offered by the Pabst witnesses 
reveals that no one claimed the neighborhood in general was no longer 
residential.  Maps from the era show that the south side of Virginia 
Street, directly opposite the mansion, remained fully residential, as did 
much of the area farther to the south and east of the property.  To the 
south of Virginia Street, the area was, and indeed today still is (one 
short block farther south), completely residential.  These matters can be 
seen in Figures 6 and 7 on the following page. 
 
107. JOHN GURDA, THE MAKING OF MILWAUKEE 172−73 (3d ed. 2008). 
108. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899). 
109. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 33, at 38–41 (testimony of Worden, 
Reinertsen). 
110. Melms, 104 Wis. at 8, 79 N.W. at 738 (the mansion became “wholly undesirable” as 
a residential property). 
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Figure 6. This map, primarily taken from Rascher’s Fire Insurance Atlas of 
the City of Milwaukee (1876 as updated 1885) and combined with the 1888 
Rascher’s, depicts the Melms mansion and vicinity at the time of the 1891–
1892 teardown. Note the neighborhood of houses on the other side of 
Virginia St. and continuing south toward Park St. (and farther south 
beyond the margin of this excerpted image). Courtesy of the Milwaukee 
Public Library. 
 
Figure 7. This modern aerial view (© Google) shows the site today. Note 
the houses on Bruce St. (formerly Park St.) and continuing to the south. 
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There is a broader lesson in this mischaracterization of the facts.  If 
demolishing the mansion was ameliorative waste, then the tenant 
himself created the condition that he was ameliorating.  This suggests a 
serious complication in using economic value as a measuring stick for 
determining waste.  What is the temporal baseline against which one 
measures changes in economic value?  In the Melms case, if the baseline 
is 1870, when the South Side Brewery was a fully functioning operation, 
tearing down the mansion would have reduced the market value of the 
property.  If the baseline is 1890, when Captain Pabst had closed the 
brewery and excavated around the mansion, then tearing down the 
mansion presumably enhanced the market value of the property.  By 
picking 1890 (or so) rather than 1870 as the baseline, the Wisconsin 
courts made it much easier to let Captain Pabst off the hook.111 
V. 
These ruminations about the Melms case are designed to explain a 
fundamental shift in the law of waste.  This is not the shift usually 
discussed in the literature.  Starting with Morton Horwitz’s work, 
American scholarship has focused on the early nineteenth century as a 
time when the law of waste took a decisive turn away from English law, 
allegedly in the direction of a more flexible pro-development doctrine.112  
Whether any such turn occurred at that time is doubtful.  Some of the 
cases discussed by Horwitz in fact reaffirmed the English view.113  In any 
event, the cases cited in support of the supposed break with English law 
all involved issues of agricultural cultivation, especially clearing trees for 
planting.  It is not clear that there was any real difference between 
 
111. There was still the matter of the quarter acre of land on which the mansion sat, 
which was included in the Melms homestead rights.  Pabst succeeded in acquiring the 
remainder interest of one of the seven children, and brought an action in partition against the 
other six children, hoping to force a judicial sale and acquire the remaining rights.  In its fifth 
reported decision involving the Melms children, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to 
grant partition, on the ground that Pabst held the entire life estate and hence there was no 
“divided possession” between Pabst and the children.  Pabst Brewing Co. v. Melms, 105 Wis. 
441, 443, 81 N.W. 882, 882 (1900).  Although Marie had died the previous year—which meant 
that Pabst and the children did have divided possession—apparently no one apprised the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court of this fact.  
112. See HORWITZ, supra note 3.  PURDY, supra note 3, and Sprankling, supra note 3, 
appear largely to accept this characterization. 
113. See HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 54–55 (discussing Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns 227 
(N.Y. 1810), which applied English waste law).  Horwitz relies primarily on statements made 
by the dissent.  See id. at 55.  PURDY, supra note 3, at 50–53, also vests great significance in 
the Jackson v. Brownson dissent.  
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English and American law on this point.114  If there were differences in 
the results reached, they are easily explained by differences in the facts 
on the ground: the English cases involved an established agrarian 
society and American cases an agrarian society in the process of being 
created out of a wilderness.  There is no reason to believe that the 
English courts, if they had had jurisdiction, would have decided the 
cases about clearing forests to plant crops any differently than the 
American courts did. 
The real transformation in the American law of waste occurred not 
in the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth.  That transformation was 
not a manifestation of inexorable social and economic change.  Rather, 
it was a top-down reform influenced by the Legal Realist movement.  
Two decisions framed the argument for reforming the law of waste.  
One was Melms.  The other was a New York decision, Brokaw v. 
Fairchild.115  The two decisions involved striking similarities in their 
facts, but very different outcomes.116 
At the center of both cases were large stately mansions constructed 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  In each, a life tenant wanted 
to tear down the mansion and replace it with a more economically 
valuable use: industrial property in the case of the Melms mansion,117 a 
high-rise apartment in the case of the Brokaw mansion.118  In each, 
persons with interests in remainders following the life estate objected to 
the destruction.  In Melms, the heirs of the Melms estate sought double 
damages under Wisconsin law after the life tenant demolished the 
mansion.119  In Brokaw, nieces and nephews who had a small chance of 
inheriting the property sought an injunction to prevent the life tenant 
from tearing down the mansion.120 
 
114. Melms itself cited two English equity cases, noting that “even in England” a change 
in agricultural uses by a tenant “will not be enjoined in equity when it clearly appears that the 
change will be, in effect, a meliorating change which rather improves the inheritance than 
injures it.”  Melms, 104 Wis. at 11, 79 N.W. at 739 (citing Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. 
Cas. 709 (H.L), and In re McIntosh, (1891) 61 L.J.Q.B. 164).  
115. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div. 
1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931).  
116. The Restatement of Property gives two illustrations of ameliorative waste, one based 
on the facts of Melms and the other based on the facts of Brokaw.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
PROPERTY § 140 cmt. f (1936). 
117. Melms, 104 Wis. at 13, 15–16, 79 N.W. at 740, 741. 
118. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 14. 
119. Melms, 104 Wis. at 7, 79 N.W. at 738. 
120. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 12. 
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The orthodox view of the two cases, as it emerged in the 1930s, is 
roughly as follows.  Melms was correctly decided.121  The Melms court 
recognized that a rigid and unbending view of ameliorative waste is 
undesirable.  Courts should not always insist on preservation of the 
property, but should take into account a variety of factors, such as 
changed circumstances of the neighborhood and relative economic 
values, before deciding whether ameliorative waste should be 
condemned.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in deciding that the Pabst 
Brewing Company had not committed waste, was therefore correct to 
eschew any rigid rule against fundamental transformation of the 
property. 
Brokaw (the orthodox view continues) was wrongly decided.122  Isaac 
Brokaw, a wealthy New Yorker, built a complex of mansions on Fifth 
Avenue between 79th and 80th streets.123  He left each of his children a 
mansion, to be held by them for life, and then inherited by their 
children; only if his children left no children was the property to be 
inherited by his other children’s children, that is, the nieces and nephews 
of the life tenant.124  After Isaac’s death in 1913, the preferred use of 
land on Fifth Avenue changed, with mansions coming down and 
apartment buildings going up.  Isaac’s son George, who had the mansion 
at the corner of 79th Street and Fifth Avenue, found living in the old 
mansion oppressive.  It was large and drafty, and expensive to maintain.  
George tried to rent it out, but found no takers.  He proposed 
demolishing the mansion and building a thirteen-story apartment 
building.125  When some of his nieces and nephews objected, the New 
York courts agreed that demolition of the mansion would be waste.126 
 
121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 140 cmt. f (1936) (using the facts of Melms 
as an illustration and indicating that the case was decided correctly). 
122. Id. (using the facts of Brokaw as an illustration and indicating that the case was 
decided incorrectly). 
123. Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 9–10. 
124. Id. at 12. 
125. Id. at 10–11. 
126. Id. at 14.  
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Figure 8. The Isaac Brokaw Mansion, 5th Avenue and 79th Street, New York City. 
Undated. The mansion was razed in 1965 in favor of a 25-story apartment building. 
Courtesy of the Museum of the City of New York. The Underhill Collection. B.1642. 
The Brokaw decision was widely condemned by leading law 
professors of the day, especially those influenced by the Realist 
movement.127  It was decried as rigid and unreasonable, an impediment 
to progress.128  A blue-ribbon panel of law reformers, the New York Law 
Revision Commission, recommended that the decision be overturned by 
the New York legislature.129  The commission’s idea of a sound approach 
to the law was the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Melms.130  The 
commission proposed a five-part test for determining whether an action 
is waste, including whether the area has experienced changed 
circumstances and whether the modification would enhance the value of 
 
127. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 13, at 97–98 (describing Brokaw as “notorious” and 
“unfortunate”). 
128. See id. at 98–99 (describing reaction of New York legislature to remove effect of 
case by creating a more flexible rule). 
129. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), 158th Sess. 7, 45 (1935). 
130. See id. at 51–52.  
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the property.131  The New York legislature adopted the proposed law in 
1937, and it remains in effect today.132 
The New York reform proved to be highly influential with bodies 
such as the American Law Institute, which also adopted a test consistent 
with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of Property.133  Eventually, a 
majority of states adopted the Melms approach, looking to multiple 
factors including changed circumstances and economic value in deciding 
whether voluntary transformation of property should be regarded as 
waste.134  Only a minority—about ten states—continue today to adhere 
to the Brokaw approach, which condemns as waste any material 
alteration of the property.135 
At bottom, Melms and Brokaw embody conflicting views of the 
basic purpose of the law of property.  Brokaw views property as an 
individual right.  Isaac Brokaw had a right to specify that his 
grandchildren would inherit the mansions he built.  This is different 
from the right to say that they would inherit either the mansions or 
something else having equal or greater monetary value, such as an 
apartment house.  Melms is understood to embody the view of property 
as a social institution.  The ultimate question is, what was the highest 
and best use of land?  Is the site better suited for a mansion or a factory?  
If the correct answer is a site for a factory, then the law should facilitate 
the efforts of individuals to reach the correct answer, without regard to 
what particular individuals with possibly idiosyncratic views might think.  
 
131. See id. at 60–61. 
132. See 1937 N.Y. Laws 618, 618–19; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 803 (McKinney 
2009). 
133. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 138–145 (1936).  Richard Powell, the 
Reporter for the Restatement, described the Melms decision as “eminently sound.”  9 A.L.I. 
PROC. 78, 123 (1930–1931). 
134. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 1212–16. 
135. Gina Cora, Want Not, Waste Not: Contracting Around the Law of Ameliorative 
Waste 11 (Apr. 1, 2009) (Yale Law School Student Scholarship: Student Prize Papers: Paper 
47), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/47.  The article also notes that nine 
states and the District of Columbia have no law on the subject.  Id. at 1.  As Judge Posner 
points out in his comment, the property casebook I authored with Henry Smith describes the 
Melms approach as a “minority” view.  Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of 
Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095, 1096 n.4 (2011) (citing THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. 
SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 604 (2007)) [hereinafter Comment].  We 
wrote without the benefit of Ms. Cora’s fifty-state survey, see Cora, supra, which shows that 
some kind of multifactor or economic-value approach is now the majority view and that the 
common-law test applied in Brokaw has become the minority view.  The statement in the 
casebook will be revised in the next edition. 
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Melms is the catalytic decision that began the process of remaking the 
doctrine in this fashion.136 
This is why I said at the outset that Melms may be the most 
important U.S. decision on the subject of waste.  It served as the model 
for what the modern approach to waste should look like, and led, 
directly or indirectly, to a reformation in the doctrine that now prevails 
in a majority of American jurisdictions.  Before Melms, a Brokaw-like 
understanding prevailed, whereby the tenant was required to return the 
property to the absent owner without material alteration.137  After 
Melms, the understanding has increasingly become that the tenant is 
required to return something of equal (or greater) economic value to 
whatever it was the absent owner gave up. 
VI. 
The ultimate question, of course, is whether this was a change for the 
better.  To help answer that question, we need to consider how the 
doctrine of waste actually functions in the modern world. 
It turns out that it functions silently, and mostly in the background.  
The reason for this is that the issues governed by the law of waste are 
today largely handled by contract.138  The law of waste has always been 
understood to be subject to modification by contract.  At common law, 
if a conveyance was made “without impeachment for waste,” this meant 
the tenant was free to make modifications to the property that otherwise 
might be chargeable as waste.139  Over time, contractual provisions 
concerning the treatment of property by tenants have become 
ubiquitous, to the point where the action for waste is rarely invoked.140 
 
136. Although Melms used economic value as only one factor to be considered in 
determining whether a tenant has committed waste, economic value will be strongly 
correlated with other factors the court cited, such as changed circumstances and reasonable 
use.  Thus, it was not too great a distance from Melms to regarding loss of economic value as 
the defining characteristic of waste.  Indeed, Wisconsin has moved in this direction.  See 
Manor Enter., Inc. v. Vivid, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 382, 401–02, 596 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Ct. App. 
1999) (stating that an action for waste lies only when the tenant has caused “a substantial 
diminution in the value of the estate”). 
137. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (regarding “material alteration”).  
138. See PURDY, supra note 3, at 665.   
139. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, § 56.02.   
140. The evidence for this is inferential rather than direct.  Judge Posner cites an 
electronic search revealing 255 “waste cases” in the last ten years.  Posner, Comment, supra 
note 135, at 1099 n.9.  But without further details, it is difficult to know how many of these 
cases involved a seriously contested waste claim.  The most comprehensive treatment of 
waste in a modern treatise is STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 2, which devotes five 
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The reason for this is probably that the costs of contracting have 
steadily fallen, first through the widespread use of standard-form 
contracts, more recently through the use of easily copied digital files.  As 
contracting has become cheaper, contractual solutions have increasingly 
squeezed out the solution imposed by the law of waste. 
Consider landlord-tenant relations.  The law of waste provides an 
important background principle for landlord-tenant relations.  But 
today, nearly every leasehold longer than a month-to-month tenancy is 
governed by a written lease.141  And nearly every written lease will spell 
out, in some fashion, the respective duties of the landlord and tenant in 
terms of maintaining the property, as well as the tenant’s obligation to 
obtain the landlord’s permission before undertaking any significant 
modification of the property.142  When disputes arise over the tenant’s 
failure to maintain the property, or over the tenant’s attempts to change 
the property, these disputes are nearly always resolved in terms of these 
lease provisions, not in terms of the law of waste.143 
Similarly, take family wealth settlements.  Again, if someone wants 
to divide family property over two or more generations, the law of waste 
provides an important background principle in describing the respective 
duties of the present and future generations.  But today, if specific assets 
are conveyed to one person for life and then to one or more 
remaindermen after that person dies, this is nearly always done by 
creating a trust.144  The trust instrument will spell out what powers the 
trustee has to sell, mortgage, or modify specific assets held in trust.  
When a dispute arises over whether to turn the family mansion into a 
bed-and-breakfast, it will be resolved by the trustee, subject to review 
 
sections to the subject.  See id. §§ 4.1–4.5.  For the last two decades covered by their treatise 
(1980–2000), they cite twenty-eight appellate decisions from twenty-one states.  In other 
words, appellate decisions worth citing are being produced at a rate of only slightly more than 
one per year, and there are no notable opinions in over half of the states during this period.  
Of course, appellate opinions are but a small fraction of cases filed in trial courts.  
Nevertheless, the treatise data suggest to me that relatively few waste claims are advanced in 
court, and that the vast majority of disputes between landlords and tenants, or between life 
beneficiaries and remaindermen, are today resolved by contract.  
141. 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 
§ 22:2.1, at 22–10 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2004). 
142. See id. § 22:7, at 22–28 (describing how parties intending to change the premises 
during a lease ought to include within the lease specific agreements and outlines of plans). 
143. Id. § 22:2.1, at 22–10 (“Current leases invariably make some reference to alterations 
or improvements of the leased premises, and it is the interpretation and construction of these 
stipulations that govern the rights and duties of today’s tenants.”).  
144. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 553 (8th ed. 2009) 
(noting that conveying a life estate outside a trust is today “rare and almost always unwise”). 
MELMS 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  11:02 PM 
1086 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1055 
for compliance with the trust instrument and general trustee duties, not 
under the law of waste.145 
Importantly, nearly every dispute over the tenant’s treatment of 
property presents not one but two potential opportunities to resolve the 
issue by contract.  The issue can be resolved ex ante, by drafting 
appropriate provisions in the lease or the trust.  But if the issue is 
overlooked, or the parties are not happy with the resolution that has 
been adopted ex ante, then there will be another opportunity to 
negotiate a contractual solution ex post.  Ex post, the transaction costs 
of contracting will be higher, given that the parties are locked into a 
relationship with each other—a bilateral monopoly—and this can lead 
to extensive strategic maneuvering or even to bargaining breakdown.146  
Nevertheless, contractual modifications of duties toward specific 
property can be and often are modified ex post.  Landlords and tenants 
do renegotiate leases, and beneficiaries do persuade trustees to modify 
their management of property under trust.  These negotiations provide a 
second opportunity for a contractual solution, if for some reason the 
parties are dissatisfied with the first contractual solution. 
Because the law of waste has been largely superseded by contract, 
the question about what form the law of waste should take can be seen 
as a question about the best default rule—that is, the best gap filler to 
apply when the contract is silent.147  If we view the doctrine as a type of 
contract default rule, what is the best version of the law of waste? 
Given that nearly all disputes between tenants and absent owners 
are today resolved by contract, a simple, intuitive rule that is easy to 
apply without expert input may be the best default.  The reason is 
straightforward: such a rule will reduce the cost of contracting.  Let us 
assume that the parties to a potential waste dispute both understand the 
outcome that would maximize their joint welfare.  Taking the Melms 
dispute as an example, let us say the optimal outcome is to tear down 
the mansion and level the ground as an industrial site.  In order to agree 
contractually on this outcome, however, the parties must agree on which 
party must make concessions to the other and in what amount.  Must the 
life tenant (Pabst) make a side payment to the remaindermen (the 
Melms children) in order to obtain their permission to make the 
 
145. See POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11.  
146. See id.  
147. There is a large literature on contract default rules.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1993). 
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change?  Or can the life tenant proceed without the permission of the 
remaindermen, and perhaps even demand a contribution from them as a 
condition of making the change (for eliminating the cost to them of 
future demolition)?  If the default rule is uncertain or requires extensive 
investigation, then it will be more difficult for the parties to reach an 
agreement on these issues.  A simple, intuitive, self-applying rule, in 
contrast, is likely to make the baseline of entitlement clear to both 
parties, and hence will facilitate the process of reaching a contractual 
solution that prescribes the optimal outcome. 
The commentary on the law of waste, in contrast, tends to assume 
that the rule should be designed not to reduce the costs of contracting, 
but to allow courts to reach the right outcome in litigated disputes.  This 
would be the correct perspective if most or even a significant number of 
such disputes were resolved through litigation.  But I have suggested 
that this is not in fact the case.  The law of waste functions as a default 
rule or baseline for contracting, not as a decisional rule applied by 
courts—at least not very often. 
Given their court-centered perspective, the commentators argue in 
effect that courts should adopt, as a default rule, the rule that the parties 
would have adopted for themselves if they had thought about the 
problem.  This will presumably leave them better off than any other 
rule, and the objective of contracting is to enhance the joint welfare of 
the contracting parties. 
One prominent suggestion along these lines, urged by John Henry 
Merryman, a Stanford law professor who wrote the chapter on waste for 
the American Law of Property,148 would ask the following in each 
individual case: what would these particular parties have agreed upon 
had they thought about the matter, based on their individual wants and 
desires?  In effect, the question in every case should be one of intention: 
did the tenant’s actions contravene or frustrate the intentions of the 
parties?  All the circumstances of the parties should be considered in 
answering this question.  If no signposts of intention can be uncovered, 
then the parties should be presumed to have intended that the tenant 
would engage in reasonable conduct, in light of all the facts.149 
Another approach, which also adopts a court-centered perspective, 
asks instead, what would persons in general have agreed upon in these 
circumstances?  This is the approach urged by Judge Richard Posner in 
 
148. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, at v.   
149. Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11. 
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his Economic Analysis of Law.150  Judge Posner observes that the tenant 
and the owner have different time horizons.  The tenant will generally 
want to maximize the return to the property during the time the tenant 
is in possession; the absent owner will want to maximize the return 
during the time after the tenancy ends.151  Posner argues that the best 
approach is to maximize the value of the property over both periods.  
This yields the largest net value, which the parties can divide among 
themselves as they wish.152  This is also the approach, Posner says, that 
an economically rational owner who holds an undivided interest in the 
property would adopt.153  The appropriate default rule for judging the 
actions of the tenant is thus whether the tenant has acted in the way an 
economically rational owner of an undivided interest in the property 
would have acted.154  Here we see the idea that the proper measure of 
property is social value, measured by market prices, adopted explicitly. 
Neither approach, it seems to me, is likely to be optimal if it turns 
out that nearly all disputes between tenants and absent owners are 
resolved by contract.  The most basic difficulty is that both approaches 
are relatively expensive, because they make waste turn on something 
that is invisible.  The parties’ intentions are not readily visible to the 
naked eye, nor is the market value of the property.  I am not saying that 
these things are not real.  But they cannot be observed by ordinary 
people.  They require investigation and expertise. 
This means, in turn, that using either parties’ intentions or economic 
value as a criterion for identifying waste will be relatively expensive.  
Merryman’s intent test will often require a complicated inquiry into 
legal documents and personal circumstances that cannot be discerned by 
looking at the land.  An investigation into the circumstances of the 
parties may be required, as well as consultation with legal experts about 
the proper interpretation of the terms in leases, wills, and trusts.  
Posner’s economic-value approach is also expensive.  Experts will have 
to testify about different uses of property and different market values 
for different uses. 
Legal standards that require extensive fact-finding and expert advice 
are not always bad things.  But in this context, they are misplaced.  
Given that disputes about tenant conduct are today overwhelmingly 
 
150. POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11. 
151. See Merryman, supra note 13, § 20.11. 
152. POSNER, supra note 3, § 3.11. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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resolved by contract, the default rule should be one that makes it easiest 
to contract.  Specifically, the rule should be one that ordinary 
individuals can discern and apply without having to resort to legal 
investigation or a real-estate appraiser.  Such a rule will make it much 
easier for the parties to understand whether they want to deviate from 
the default rule, and what the contract must say if they want a different 
result.155 
Another problem associated with both the Merryman and the 
Posner solutions is that there will likely be considerable uncertainty 
about their proper application.  Under Merryman’s approach, it is not 
always clear whose intention counts.  In a landlord-tenant relationship, 
is it just the landlord’s intention, or is it also the tenant’s?  If the 
landlord assigns the reversion to another landlord, which landlord’s 
intent counts?  If the tenant assigns the lease to another tenant, which 
tenant’s intent counts?  In the life-estate context, do only intentions of 
the grantor count?  What if a life estate is created by legal election, as in 
the case of the Melms estate?  The root of the problem is that temporal 
divisions of property are not simple variations on conventional bilateral 
contracts.  Property rights can be transferred and divided in a variety of 
ways, and it is far from clear that there is some unique set of intentions 
that attach to every decision to divide title over time.156 
Posner’s economic-value test suffers from a different uncertainty in 
application, related to picking the appropriate baseline for comparing 
two different states of the world.  Posner’s discussion presupposes that 
each parcel of property will have a unique value-maximizing use, and 
that the rational owner will always adopt this use.  But there will often 
be uncertainties about the proper unit of time or the proper physical 
unit for applying the economic-value test.  For example, persons often 
acquire property intending to hold it for future expansion or 
development.  This may entail holding it in a suboptimal use for a 
significant time until the development can take place.  Likewise, persons 
may hold multiple parcels of property, which fit together in a general 
scheme or plan, even though individual parcels are deployed in ways 
that are suboptimal from a market perspective.  These uncertainties 
 
155. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985) (arguing that courts in low-transaction-cost settings 
should adopt rules that minimize “entitlement-determination costs”). 
156. Here as elsewhere in property law there is a mixture of contractual and property 
elements, and the intentions of the parties are often channeled into a fixed menu of property 
forms.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). 
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generate even greater need for expert input and undoubtedly magnify 
the expense associated with the use of the test. 
If disagreements about modifications of property by tenants were 
nearly always resolved by litigation, then I would agree that either 
Merryman’s intent test or Posner’s economic-value rule might be 
warranted.  Such rules would be more uncertain and expensive to 
administer.  But they would allow courts to reach judgments that would 
produce more satisfactory outcomes, from either an individual or a 
social-welfare perspective.157 
The extreme infrequency of modern cases applying the doctrine of 
waste, however, strongly suggests that contractual solutions are the 
norm, not litigation.  Given the ubiquity of contractual solutions to the 
problem, the default rule should be designed to induce the parties to 
address the issue by contract.  Jed Purdy, in writing about this issue, has 
used the phrase “bargain-inducing default rule,” which seems to me to 
capture the idea nicely.158 
VII. 
If the intention test and the economic-value test are too expensive 
because they require expert input and are uncertain in application, then 
does the traditional common-law rule—forbidding material alterations 
in the premises—function better as a default rule in a context where 
contractual solutions are the norm?  The answer, I think, is “Yes.” 
The critical facts under the traditional rule are the condition and use 
of the property when title is first divided, and the condition and use of 
the property when the tenant’s custodial practices are challenged.  
These facts are visible to the naked eye.  To determine these facts, one 
does not have to consult lawyers schooled in the interpretation of legal 
documents, or real-estate appraisers adept at assessing the market value 
of property.  One need only examine the property itself or—in the event 
the property has been modified—consult architectural drawings, 
photographs, or evidence about its condition when title was divided.  
 
157. See id. at 852 (arguing that courts in high-transaction-cost settings should adopt 
rules that permit discretionary judgments maximizing the wealth of the parties). 
158. PURDY, supra note 3, at 665.  Purdy apparently understands by this term what Alan 
Schwartz called an “equilibrium-inducing default.”  Schwartz states as follows: “[A]n 
equilibrium-inducing default rule induces parties to choose the welfare-maximizing term.  
Parties respond to an equilibrium-inducing default either by accepting it or by contracting to 
another term.  The default is correctly designed if parties accept it when it directs the efficient 
outcome, and contract to an efficient term otherwise.”  Schwartz, supra note 147, at 390.   
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We do not need to take elaborate evidence about what the parties 
intended when they divided the property; what most owners would have 
done with the property under the circumstances; what the economic 
value of the property was before and after the tenant modified it; 
whether the neighborhood has changed and, if so, whether the source of 
the change was independent of the tenant’s actions; and so on and so 
forth. 
Given these features, the traditional common-law rule should 
function well as a bargain-inducing default rule.  It is simple, intuitive, 
and self-applying.159  It sends a clear signal to the parties about their 
respective rights and obligations.  If the parties want a different rule, 
they will know that they must contract for a different rule.  The 
traditional rule will thus facilitate contractual solutions, and it will do so 
both ex ante and ex post.160 
The traditional rule also avoids knotty questions about application 
that arise under either the Merryman intent rule or the Posner 
economic-value approach.  The condition and use of the property when 
the property is first divided set the baseline against which future tenant 
behavior is measured.  If the tenant materially changes the condition, 
the tenant has committed waste; otherwise not.  The condition of the 
property when title is divided is a physical fact that exists with respect to 
every parcel of property whose title is divided.  The condition when the 
dispute erupts is also a physical fact that exists with respect to every 
 
159. New York courts have enforced lease terms requiring the consent of the landlord to 
any alteration in the premises even in the face of plausible arguments that the tenant’s  
modifications have enhanced the value of the property.  See Gabin v. Goldstein, 497 N.Y.S.2d 
984, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Freehold Investments v. Richstone, 340 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (Sup. Ct.), 
rev’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Div. 1973), rev’d, 311 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1974).  In support of 
this outcome, these courts, interestingly, have cited the common-law rule that any material 
alteration in the premises is waste, even if the value of the property is enhanced by the 
alteration, Gabin, 497 N.Y.S.2d, at 987; Freehold Investments, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 364—without 
noting that the common-law rule has been overturned in New York by statute.  See supra 
notes 127–32 and accompanying text.  This suggests that the “no material alteration” 
conception of waste has an intuitive pull that endures even in the face of the Legal Realist 
campaign to substitute a standard of value maximization.   
160. The matter is complicated by the fact that a clear but one-sided default rule can 
interfere with bargaining, especially under conditions of bilateral monopoly.  See Robert 
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23–24 (1982) (noting that strategic behavior 
may cause bargaining to break down).  But the clarity of the default rule does not always 
eliminate ex post bargaining.  If the tenant wants to make a modification that will enhance the 
value of the property, this will generate new wealth which can be divided between the parties 
as part of the bargaining over whether to permit the change.  A clear default rule may mean 
that the tenant will have to share some of the gains with the absent owner.  But this does not 
mean that the change will not occur. 
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parcel whose title is divided.  There are thus no conundrums about 
application, analogous to whose intent we consult under the Merryman 
test or what unit we use for valuation under the Posner approach. 
Admittedly, the qualifier “material” in the common-law rule injects 
a bit of wiggle room.  What it means, I think, is that the rule is to be 
applied with a view to normal owner behavior.161  In other words, given 
the condition of the property at the time the title is divided, what actions 
would a normal owner take in maintaining the property in this 
condition?  We do not ask whether a normal owner would change the 
condition of the property.  We just ask what a normal owner would do 
in order to preserve the condition unchanged. 
Let me offer an illustration.  Some of the early common-law judges 
and commentators got tied up in knots trying to specify when a tenant is 
allowed to cut down trees.162  They said that cutting down trees to profit 
from the timber was waste, whereas cutting down trees for necessary 
repairs to the estate or for fuel was not waste; and so forth.163  A better 
understanding would be that courts should look to what constitutes 
normal behavior.  If an agricultural tenant would normally cut some 
trees to repair fences and for firewood, then this would not be a material 
alteration.  If an agricultural tenant would not normally cut trees for 
commercial sale, then it would be a material alteration.  Most of the 
early cases about trees are consistent with this general understanding, 
whatever verbal formulations they may have adopted. 
VIII. 
There is still more to be said in support of the traditional common-
law rule.  One can think of all sorts of clear rules that might serve as 
bargain-inducing default rules.  “The tenant can do whatever he wants,” 
would be one such a rule.  “The tenant must do whatever the absent 
owner says,” would be another.  What we need is not just a bright-line 
default rule, but a rule that harmonizes with broader understandings 
 
161. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 731–32 (1973) (employing normal use, as 
measured by “contemporary community standards,” as a baseline in nuisance law). 
162. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *281–82; 1 EDWARD COKE, THE 
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON 
LITTLETON § 67 (53.a–.b) (18th ed. 1823).  
163. See, e.g., Anon Y.B. 44 Edw. III, f. 44, pl. 58 (1370) (establishing an exception to 
waste for necessary repairs to the estate).  For early American cases holding that a tenant has 
the right to cut firewood, see Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick. 152 (Mass. 1828); Webster v. 
Webster, 33 N.H. 18, 66 Am. Dec. 705 (1856).   
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about the value and function of property as an institution in our society. 
The traditional common-law rule, in prohibiting the tenant from 
making any material alteration in the property, broadly comports with 
the understanding that the purpose of the institution of property is to 
protect the subjective expectations particular owners have in particular 
things.  When possession is temporarily transferred, the owner is 
entitled to expect that what comes back is the same thing the owner had 
when possession was transferred.  Not something else of equivalent 
value.  The thing itself.  The traditional rule is the kind of rule that we 
would expect to be adopted by a legal system that conceives of property 
as an individual right, not simply a social arrangement for maximizing 
wealth. 
Wait a moment, you may object: if title is divided, then there are at 
least two people who have some stake in the thing—the absent owner 
and the tenant.  The common-law rule protects the autonomy of the 
absent owner about her thing, but it does so by disregarding the 
interests of the tenant regarding the thing.  Why adopt a rule that 
protects one party at the expense of the other?  Why not balance their 
interests, or adopt some kind of approach that tries to reach an 
accommodation by giving weight to both interests? 
Part of the answer is that we are dealing here with probabilities.  The 
law of waste makes the judgment that the absent owner is more likely to 
have a strong subjective attachment to property than is the tenant 
temporarily in possession.  This is just a generalization.  For leases and 
life estates of relatively short duration, the generalization almost always 
holds true.  The absent owner—the landlord or the remainderman—will 
have a stronger attachment to the property and a stronger claim to 
control its configuration and use.  In other circumstances, the 
generalization will not hold true.  A tenant under a ninety-nine-year 
lease will have much stronger subjective expectations about the 
property than the landlord holding the reversion.  Note, however, that 
the exceptional cases are precisely those in which we would most expect 
to find a contract giving the tenant discretion to modify the use of the 
property.  Any lawyer for a tenant under a very long-term lease would 
be guilty of malpractice if she did not attend carefully to the issue of 
tenant modifications.  The common law, by giving the right to control to 
the absent owner, reaches the right result in the largest number of cases, 
and allows the smaller number of cases where this does not work to be 
handled by contract. 
Another and more fundamental part of the answer is that we cannot 
balance interests between tenant and absent owner without abandoning 
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the idea of property as an individual right.  If property is a right of 
particular persons to protect their subjective expectations about things, 
then property must confer sovereign-like powers on those we regard as 
owners.  This includes the power to give possession of your property to 
others and expect to get it back.  Maybe in other contexts, like pollution 
control and eminent domain, we have no choice but to switch to the idea 
of property as a balance of competing interests, or a social institution 
with outcomes measured by market values.  But in the relatively simple 
bilateral disputes governed by waste doctrine, there is no need to 
introduce these complexities. 
In short, waste is one area where we do not have to choose between 
the traditional understanding of property as an individual right and the 
rival conception of property as an institution for maximizing social 
value.  We can retain the understanding of property as an individual 
right, and rely on the institution of contract to protect the societal 
interest in deploying resources to the greatest social advantage.  There 
would seem to be little reason to abandon the idea of property as a 
source of protection for individual autonomy absent a strong 
justification for doing so.  No such justification exists here. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Melms started us down the path 
toward a law of waste characterized by utilitarian balancing and 
economic valuations of competing uses of land.  There was no need to 
do so.  Captain Pabst should have been absolved of liability based on his 
good-faith mistake about title to the mansion.  The law of waste should 
have been left unchanged.  Had it remained unchanged, it is possible 
that it would remain unchanged today. 
